Συνέντευξη Ντόρας Μπακογιάννη στην εφημερίδα Athens News (στα αγγλικά).

Athens News: How real is the threat of a Greek exit from the eurozone? Some people maintain that the threat is not credible, since the cost of a “Grexit” for the rest of the eurozone would be too high.

Dora Bakoyannis: Yes, there is a clear danger of Greece exiting the eurozone. Obviously, there are no institutional means to bring this about. But there are two things one must take into account. Firstly, that the EU has overlooked several rules applied up to now in the way it has faced the euro crisis. One of the most blatant, for example, was that though bailing out a member was not allowed, it did actually take place. Secondly, if a Tsipras-led government declares that Greece’s commitments – emanating from the country’s agreements with the EU, the ECB and the IMF – will not be respected, the most likely outcome on the part of the lenders will be suspension of the loan’s next instalments.

Unable to cover the expenses necessary to maintain the functions of the state, Greece will be forced to resort to other forms of payment. Exiting the euro will then become the de facto outcome of both Greece’s and the EU’s extreme stance.

But there is a further danger: As Greece will have to resort to measures that are incompatible with the rules and functions of the eurozone in order to protect the banks and so on, there is a real possibility it will have to exit the EU as well, as it would be unable to observe the union’s basic rules. Tsipras, Kammenos and others who are “assuring” indignant Greeks – particularly those who have no knowledge of how the union, Europe and global economy work – that there is no such danger are committing a crime against the country. This is doubly true of those – and I’m afraid there are many – who are so blatantly misleading the public.

Unemployment in Greece is rising, enterprises are shutting down and investments keep decreasing. Is there a light at the end of the tunnel?

Greece has enormous dormant powers in both its human and material capital. It can surprise the world again, as it has done time and again in the past. Our youth is well-educated and often multilingual; Greeks own the largest merchant marine fleet in the world; we’ve got 16,000km of coastline and nearly 3,000 islands and islets; the income from both tourism and the sea can easily be doubled – solving the debt problem from just these two sources.

There are pockets of excellence in high-tech industries, too: pharmaceutical products are state-of-the-art and several of our engineers have been employed by Nasa; we produce fine agricultural products of all sorts: two weeks ago Greek wines came back from international contests with loads of gold and silver medals. It’s a shame that 75 percent of Greek olive oil, the best in the world, is still sold raw to other Mediterranean countries to upgrade their own olive oil.

There is the service industry, with Greek banks controlling more than 20 percent of banking in several southeastern European countries, and precious mineral and other resources (including gold and uranium, as well as lignite, oil, natural gas and solar energy). Last but not least, the country’s geographic position can attract services of enormous potential: Cosco, in Piraeus, tripled the number of containers handled in just one year since privatisation.

The so-called reunification of the centre-right brought about 23 new candidates onto the ballot lists of New Democracy for the June 17 elections, mainly from Democratic Alliance. How will this project continue after the elections?

For the moment, my only concern is to help stop the country falling into the hands of anti-European forces and to avoid a default. I expect the collaboration to continue after the elections – but we can talk of all these things in due time.

Why do you think that Democratic Alliance did not make it into parliament?

There are three basic reasons. Firstly, most of us at the top of the party had only worked with a big party before; one-and-a-half years wasn’t enough to truly develop new strategies and novel methods befitting a party of an altogether different size. Secondly, our policy positions – liberal, moderate and reformist – did not gain an audience large enough in a climate of anger and polarisation. First and foremost, though, Greece’s small Liberal forces were divided between four parties. Together they would get more than 22 MPs. But my repeated efforts to unite them in a wider alliance failed. If we had succeeded, Greece would have had a government now and we would have avoided the disastrous delays of a new election.

Can ND pledge not to make any further cuts to wages and pensions, as well as not to raise the taxes, if it participates in a coalition government?

I hope so. But, as I’ve said before, this entails success in combating tax evasion and in reforming the state in a business-friendly manner. I hope that ND and its allies in government will move swiftly in both these directions. Succeeding will make further salary and pension cuts completely unnecessary, except in areas of obvious inequalities.

In what way is Greece affected by the Spanish rescue deal?

I think it enhances our position of renegotiating several non-fundamental aspects of Greece’s memorandum, particularly as no one in Europe can now deny that it has caused, in its existing form, exceedingly high human suffering, particularly to law-abiding Greeks. But, the greater our own commitment to structural change is, the friendlier will Europe be to our requests.

Realistically, what changes can the Greek government ask from the troika regarding the memorandum?

This ought to be a two-way street: Greece, for its part, must first ask for time in order to reduce the deficit without the hectic time-table currently being applied. Secondly, it must ask for the tax relief of those law-abiding citizens who are currently taking up the entire burden of the crisis while the state restructures its tax-collecting mechanisms to fight tax evasion and collect new revenues from this most fundamental of sources.

Thirdly, with consent by our other [EU] partners, we need to institutionally implement some sort of a deposits guarantee for European banks so that deposits stop leaving the country and liquidity returns to the economy.

The EU, for its part, must accelerate the process of formulating a development programme, including a restart of the four important motorways, using special provisions from the European Investment Bank, while being decisive – even relentless – with Greek authorities in removing all counter-incentives for investment and growth that persist in the Greek state and economy.

In fact, this is what the lenders should have insisted upon in the first place, rather than accepting Pasok’s diversionary tactics and excuses in undertaking structural changes; the whole affair ended in an unparalleled depression and human suffering for those it was principally called upon to defend.

The case now is to promote the necessary structural change, instead of implementing horizontal cuts in pensions and salaries before every instalment. ND and the other pro-European forces must swiftly apply a radical and thorough programme of reforms and structural changes that will take the markets by surprise and paralyse the anti-European forces inside the country. This is the only way to save Greece.